

NPK-info

Nederlands Palestina Komitee www.palestina-komitee.nl

Inhoud

Twee boeken zijn aanraders, zie www.epo.be

* Palestina - De laatste kolonie? / Lucas Catherine

* De schaduw van de ster - Zionisme en antizionisme / Peter Edel

Op de Boekenbeurs te Antwerpen is maandag de 11e een discussie met Peter Edel, zie <http://www.boek.be/>

De IDFA toont de recente film "Jenin, Jenin" van Mohammed Bakri.

Zorg ervoor dat ie de publieksprijs krijgt, zie www.idfa.nl.

Hierna:

* A new exodus for the Middle East?

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Verduidelijkt waar Israel mee bezig is en waarom [.....an iron logic: There could be no viable Jewish state in all or part of Palestine unless there was a mass displacement of Arab inhabitants.....].

* Against fragmentation, Mustafa El-Barghouti

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Vier analyses: <http://www.bitterlemons.org/>

Documenten: <http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs.html>

Volg EI: <http://electronicintifada.net/new.shtml>

Kamerverkiezingen 22 januari 2003

Zie welke partijen wat deden: <http://www.overheid.nl/op/index.html>

Handig bij partijcongressen met [www.stopdebezetting](http://www.stopdebezetting.nl) "onder de arm".

Hieronder de meest recente Kamervragenet.

Op 17 november betogen 120 Belgische NGO's in Brussel tegen een oorlog in Irak en voor een rechtvaardige vrede in Palestina.

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* http://www.motherearth.org/nowar/nl/home_nl.php

Steun de Belgische ambassadeur te Israel, zie bericht hierna.

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Deze diplomaat noemde "de Palestijnse gebieden het grootste interneringskamp ter wereld".

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT www.palsolidarity.org

Hierna ook bericht "Silent sit-in blocking bulldozers in Jayyous".

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Merk op de diplomatieke steun uit Frankrijk en Zweden.

Stop Bush-Sharon-Netanyahu-Mofaz op hun weg naar een tweede Nakba!

Waarnemers worden inmiddels al geweerd [UCP-delegatie met Gretta Duisenberg].

NPK/WL, 6-11-2002 ■

P.S. Zie <http://www.stopwar.org.uk/>

Two years of the intifada

A new exodus for the Middle East?

Rightwing Israelis are talking about 'transfer' - the expulsion of all Arabs. Shocking as it sounds, the idea once had support from British and Arab officials, reveals distinguished Israeli historian Benny Morris. And, continuing our series on the Arab-Israeli conflict, he argues the Middle East might now be at peace if Israel's first leader had driven out all the Palestinians in 1948

Thursday October 3, 2002 *The Guardian*

Once again, "transfer" is in the air - the idea of helping resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict by transferring or expelling some or all of the Arabs from Palestine. During recent weeks Israeli newspapers published an interview with Shmuel Eliahu, the chief rabbi of Safad and the son of Israel's former chief Sephardi rabbi, Mordechai Eliahu, in which he called for the transfer, to "Jordan, the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, or Canada," of Arabs who are unwilling to accept Israel as a Jewish state; and a large advertisement, by Gush Shalom (the Peace Bloc), a coalition of ultra-left groups, warning that prime minister Ariel Sharon is pressing the US to attack Iraq and intends to exploit the chaos that will follow "to carry out his old plan to expel the Palestinians from the whole country ("Transfer")."

The idea of transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and praxis during the past century. And driving it was an iron logic: There could be no viable Jewish state in all or part of Palestine unless there was a mass displacement of Arab inhabitants, who opposed its emergence and would constitute an active or potential fifth column in its midst. This logic was understood, and enunciated, before and during 1948, by Zionist, Arab and British leaders and officials.

As early as 1895, Theodor Herzl, the prophet and founder of Zionism, wrote in his diary in anticipation of the establishment of the Jewish state: "We shall try to spirit the penniless [Arab] population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country ... The removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly."

By the 1930s, matters had crystallised, with Arab gunmen attacking the British Mandate authorities and the Zionist settlers. The Arab Revolt (1936-39) aimed to force an end to Jewish immigration to Palestine and to eject the Jews' British protectors. Whitehall sent out a royal commission, chaired by Lord Peel, to investigate. It published its report in July 1937. Peel was unable to avoid the logic of transfer: The commission recommended that Palestine be partitioned between its Jewish and Arab inhabitants - and that 225,000 Arabs be transferred out of the 20% of the country it earmarked for Jewish

sovereignty (and the handful of Jews, some 1,250, living in the Arab areas be transferred to the Jewish state). A "clean and final" solution of the Palestine problem necessitated transfer, the commission ruled.

Both David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Zionist movement and Israel's first prime minister, and Chaim Weizmann, the movement's elder statesman, supported transfer. The background was the Arab revolt and the growing anti-semitic persecutions in Europe which heralded the Holocaust; the need for a safe haven for the Jews in Palestine had become acute just as Arab violence was pushing the British into closing the doors to immigration.

Ben-Gurion hailed Lord Peel's recommendations: "The compulsory transfer of the Arabs from the valleys of the proposed Jewish state could give us something which we never had ... during the days of the First and Second Temples ... an opportunity which we never dared to dream in our wildest imaginings." In August 1937 he told the emergency 20th Zionist Congress, convened in Zurich: "We do not want to dispossess, [but piecemeal] transfer of population [through Jewish purchase and the removal of Arab tenant farmers] occurred previously, in the [Jezreel] Valley, in the Sharon and in other places ... Now a transfer of a completely different scope will have to be carried out ... Transfer is what will make possible a comprehensive [Jewish] settlement programme.

Thankfully, the Arab people have vast empty areas [in Transjordan and Iraq]. Jewish power, which grows steadily, will also increase our possibilities to carry out the transfer on a large scale."

Weizmann also supported a transfer scheme and in 1941 told Ivan Maiskii, the Soviet ambassador in London (according to the envoy's own account): "If half a million Arabs could be transferred, two million Jews [ie, Jewish immigrants] could be put in their place. That, of course, would be a first instalment ..." According to Maiskii, Weizmann had proposed "to move a million Arabs ... to Iraq, and to settle four or five million Jews from Poland and other countries on the land where these Arabs were" When Maiskii queried how 4-5 million Jews could be expected to settle on lands previously inhabited by only 1 million Arabs, Weizmann replied: "The Arab is often called the son of the desert. It would

be truer to call him the father of the desert. His laziness and primitivism turn a flourishing garden into a desert.'

But it was not only the Zionist leaders who believed transfer was the solution to the problem of Palestine and its successful partition. In July 1948, midway in the first Arab-Israeli war, by which time about 400,000 Arabs had been displaced from their homes, Britain's foreign secretary (and no Zionist), Ernest Bevin, wrote: "On a long-term view ... there may be something to be said for an exchange of population between the areas assigned to the Arabs and the Jews respectively" And he added, in explication: "It might be argued that the flight of large numbers of Arabs from the territory under Jewish administration had simplified the task of arriving at a stable settlement in Palestine since some transfers of population seems [sic] to be an essential condition for such a settlement."

A few days later, London's central intelligence office in the area, the British Middle East Office, chimed in: "The panic flight of Arabs from the Jewish occupied areas of Palestine has presented a very serious immediate problem but may possibly point the way to a long-term solution of one of the greatest difficulties in the way of a satisfactory implementation of partition, namely the existence in the Jewish state of an Arab community very nearly equal in numbers to the Jewish one." It went on: "Now that the initial difficulty of persuading the Arabs of Palestine to leave their homes has been overcome ... it seems possible that the solution may lie in their transference to Iraq and Syria."

By the end of the 1948 war, some 700,000 Arabs had been displaced - to become "refugees", in the jargon of the day. Most came to rest elsewhere in Palestine, in those parts today called the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to the UN, there are today close to 4 million Palestinian "refugees", meaning those driven out in 1948 and their descendants - and they constitute the single most difficult and vexing component of the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

But Bevin's and the BMEO's understanding that this massive transfer pointed the way to a "solution" of the Palestine problem was by no means a surprising mid-war discovery. Already in the early and mid-1940s Arab leaders and senior British officials understood that transfer (as an accompaniment of partition) offered a way out of the impasse.

In April 1944 the executive of Britain's Labour party published its platform for a postwar settlement. It included full-throated endorsement of the transfer of the Arabs out of Palestine and, indeed, the expansion of the mandatory borders to facilitate the absorption of large waves of Jewish immigrants. The relevant paragraph was formulated by Hugh Dalton, the chancellor of the exchequer.

Earlier, in January 1943, an under-secretary of state at the Colonial Office, the Duke of Devonshire, proposed that Britain set up an independent Arab state in Libya and that, in exchange, the Arabs acquiesce in the establishment of a Jewish state "in Palestine". He added: "The Arab population in Palestine might be dealt with by an offer of assistance to migrate to Libya for those families who find conditions in Palestine unendurable."

General John Glubb, the British commander (1939-56) of Transjordan's army, the Arab Legion, thought there was no evading a partition solution - and that the Arab population in the areas earmarked for Jewish statehood were best transferred to the Arab areas or out of Palestine altogether. In July 1946 he penned "A Note on Partition as a Solution to the Palestine Problem". He wrote: "The best course will probably be to allow a time limit during which persons who find themselves in one or other state against their wishes, will be able to opt for citizenship of the other state ... It is not, of course, intended to move Arab[s] ... by force, but merely so to arrange that when these persons find themselves left behind in the Jewish state, well paid jobs and good prospects should be simultaneously open for them in the Arab state ..."

Glubb seemed to be speaking here of a "voluntary" transfer. But in a follow-up note, written a few weeks later, he moved toward the acceptance of some measure of compulsion as well: "When the undoubtedly Arab and undoubtedly Jewish areas had been cleared of all members of the other community ... every effort would be made [in the frontier areas] to arrange exchanges of land and population so as to leave as few people as possible to be compensated for cash." Glubb, of course, envisaged a population "exchange" involving the movement of hundreds of thousands of Arabs and only a few thousand Jews - in effect, a transfer of Arabs.

In his support of partition and transfer, Glubb faithfully mirrored the thinking of Transjordan's and Iraq's leaders. In December 1944, Nuri Said, Iraq's senior politician, told a British interlocutor that if the British imposed a partition solution for Palestine, there would be a "necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish state ...". Iraq's foreign minister, Arshad al-Umari, "repeated what Nuri had said ... [regarding] probable [Arab] reaction [to partition] and also the necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish state," according to another British official.

Lord Moyne, the British minister resident in the Middle East, a few weeks earlier reported that both Tewfiq Abul Huda, Transjordan's prime minister, and Mustafa Nahas Pasha, Egypt's prime minister, similarly believed that "a final settlement can only be reached by means of partition". Two years later, in July 1946, Alec Kirkbride,

Britain's well-informed representative in Amman, reported that Abul Huda's successor, Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, and King Abdullah of Transjordan both supported partition: "[Hashim added that] the only just and permanent solution lay in absolute partition with an exchange of populations; to leave Jews in an Arab state or Arabs in a Jewish state would lead inevitably to further trouble ... Ibrahim Pasha admitted that he would not be able to express this idea in public for fear of being called a traitor."

A month later, Kirkbride reported: "King Abdullah and prime minister of Jordan consider that partition followed by an exchange of populations is only practical solution to the Palestine problem. They do not feel able to express this view publicly ..." As all involved understood, "exchange of populations" was a euphemism for transferring the Arabs out of the area of the Jewish state-to-be.

In May 1944, the director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, Moshe Sharett, hesitantly predicted that "once the Jewish state is established - it is very possible that the result will be transfer of Arabs." In the 1948 war, which the Palestinian Arabs and the neighbouring Arab states initiated, a transfer of 700,000 of Palestine's 1.25 million Arab inhabitants duly took place.

Both before and during 1948 all understood the logic of transfer: Given Arab opposition to the very idea and existence of a Jewish state, it could not and would not be established, as a viable, lasting entity, without the displacement of the bulk of its Arab inhabitants. But the transfer of 1948 was incomplete: The overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people, both local inhabitants and refugees, remained in Palestine, many of them in poverty, a quarter of a million in the Gaza Strip, some half a million in the West Bank, and 150,000 in Israel proper. These populations today stand at 1 million, 2 million and 1.2 million respectively.

In 1967 Israel, provoked by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip and today, directly and indirectly, rules over more than 4 million Arabs (alongside the country's 5 million Jews). And the basic problems remain: Infinitely higher Arab birthrates; an intermixed population that cannot live in peace in one multi-ethnic state; and Palestinian opposition both to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and to Israel's very existence (vide what is taught Palestinian children in West Bank and Gaza schools and statements by even so-called Palestinian moderates, such as Marwan Barghouti and Faisal Husseini, not to mention the oft-publicised views of Islamist leaders such as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin). When Israeli rightwingers today speak of "transfer", they think in terms not of facilitating a partition of historic Palestine but of making a clean sweep and ridding the country of its Arab inhabitants.

The Palestinian Arab strategy of suicide bombings and the tone of rejectionism that characterises much Palestinian rhetoric, from Arafat and the Palestinian Authority radio and TV stations downwards during the past two years fuels such thinking. Israel's extreme right, which wants the "whole Land of Israel" for the Jews, ultimately posits transfer as a counterweight to this mainstream rejectionism - which, in effect, endorses a transfer of the Jews out of Palestine, or "throwing the Jews into the sea", as the phrase goes.

One wonders what Ben-Gurion - who probably could have engineered a comprehensive rather than a partial transfer in 1948, but refrained - would have made of all this, were he somehow resurrected. Perhaps he would now regret his restraint. Perhaps, had he gone the whole hog, today's Middle East would be a healthier, less violent place, with a Jewish state between Jordan and the Mediterranean and a Palestinian Arab state in Transjordan. Alternatively, Arab success in the 1948 war, with the Jews driven into the sea, would have obtained the same, historically calming result. Perhaps it was the very indecisiveness of the geographical and demographic outcome of 1948 that underlies the persisting tragedy of Palestine.

*This article is based partly on material published in *The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews* (IB Tauris, London, 2002).*

The following correction was printed in the Guardian's Corrections and Clarifications column, Monday October 7 2002

In Benny Morris's article on the expulsion of Palestinians from Israel, a number of quotes were removed when the piece was edited to fit the available space. Mr Morris believes that the comments were significant because they revealed that some Arab leaders supported the idea of moving the Palestinians from the Jewish state during the 1940s. The following passage was cut from the piece: "Nuri Said, Iraq's senior politician, told a British interlocutor that if the British imposed a partition solution for Palestine, there would be a 'necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish state...' Lord Moyne, the British minister resident in the Middle East, reported that both Tewfiq Abul Huda, Transjordan's prime minister, and Mustafa Nahas Pasha, Egypt's prime minister, similarly believed that 'a final settlement can only be reached by means of partition'. Two years later, in 1946, Alec Kirkbride, Britain's knowledgeable representative in Amman, reported that 'King Abdullah and prime minister [Ibrahim Hashim] of Jordan consider that partition followed by an exchange of populations is the only practical solution to the Palestine problem. They do not feel able to express this view publicly.' Hashim 'thought that to leave Jews in an Arab state or Arabs in a Jewish state would lead inevitably to further trouble'." ■

Against fragmentation

by *Mustafa El-Barghouti* • Friday November 01, 2002 at 12:00 PM

A reformed Palestinian government will not be enough to combat Israeli attempts at dividing the Palestinian people. What is needed is a new approach capable of mobilising Palestinian aspirations towards freedom and independence,

Israel's strategy in its campaign against the Palestinian people is to generate such a profound state of fragmentation as to sap their ability to sustain their struggle and create independent national institutions. This strategy extends beyond the geographic-demographic domain to threaten all social, economic and political aspects of Palestinian life.

It is important to note that the process of geographic-demographic fragmentation has quickened in pace since the so-called peace process began in Madrid. First, Israel cut off Jerusalem, and then Gaza, from the West Bank. Then, it proceeded to dissect the rest of the territories, cordoning cities off from villages, splitting Nablus into eastern and western sections, and cutting Hebron up into districts. As a result, the occupied territories have become not so much "one large prison", as the British Ambassador to Israel has put it, but rather a chain of prisons within one vaster jail.

This has happened very much by design. To the Palestinians, the peace process represented a bridge towards independence and statehood. To Israel, it was a "truce" to be exploited to impose new de facto realities -- since the 1992 Oslo accords Israel has constructed 87 new settlements -- and to atomise the Palestinian socio-demographic structure. This explains the notorious maps of the territories presented at Oslo, with their ring roads and cantons -- a kind of leopard's skin of spots that have now erupted into painful, disfiguring pustules.

This distressing reality, the creation of which aimed to dissipate Palestinian energies and rend the vibrant fabric that binds Palestinians together both at home and abroad, continued until the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This signaled an end to Israel's unilateral declaration of the end of the conflict and laid the foundations for reconstructing the national tissue unifying the Palestinian people.

However, it is still the case today that the external pressures being exerted on the Palestinian people aim to

augment division and discord in their ranks. These pressures have been aggravated by incidents of domestic strife and by futile attitudes that fail to place higher national interests above narrow factional ones.

A few days ago I visited Nablus on the West Bank, and among all the people I spoke to there I sensed a deep bitterness at the blindness of the media to their suffering. This feeling was equally palpable in the old quarter of Hebron, which continues to hold out steadfastly, like Nablus, against the Israeli settlers. In both cities, people kept asking, where are our officials? Why don't we see them? What's distracting them from our plight?

As I write this today, I do not know whether news of a new Palestinian government will have appeared in the press before this article does. Whatever the case, it is distressing that the formation of a new government, and the much-touted "reform process" that this is supposed to usher in, seems destined to constitute yet another step towards aggravating rivalries, discord and fragmentation, rather than a move in the opposite direction.

Our needs are greater than a pause for introspection, vaster than some new names in authority here and there in order to alleviate foreign pressures and placate international demands for reform. What we need is a new approach, one that sets its sights firmly on a unified and unifying strategy. Only through such an approach will be able to rally the energies of the Palestinian people and revive Palestinian institutions, such as the PLO, that are capable of mobilising and sustaining these energies both at home and abroad towards the realisation of our national aspiration to freedom and independence.

This approach must be bold if it is to remedy all the causes of failure, and it must be resolute if it is to resist attempts to sew or aggravate fragmentation. We need more than just a more effective government. What we need is a united national leadership at the helm of the Palestinian struggle against the occupation and for independence.

* The writer is a president of the Palestinian Medical Relief Committees and director of the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) in Ramallah. ■

Gewelddadigheden kolonisten tegen Palestijnen

<http://www.groenlinks.nl/partij/2dekamer/vragen/64000630.html>

Kamervraag

Schriftelijke vragen van het lid Karimi (Groenlinks) aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

1. Kent u het artikel 'Palestijnse olijfpickers dienen als schietschijf'?
2. Heeft Nederland al dan niet in EU verband, Israël aangesproken op het gedrag van de kolonisten nu deze gewelddadigheden steeds frequenter plaatsvinden en als doel hebben de Palestijnen van hun grond te verdrijven? Zo nee, waarom niet? Zo ja, hoe luidde de reactie van Israël?
3. Deelt u de mening dat het gewelddadige gedrag van de kolonisten tegen Palestijnse burgers de situatie laat escaleren?
4. Wie beschermen de Palestijnse burgers tegen de aan-

vallen van gewelddadige Israëlische kolonisten?

5. Deelt u de mening dat het de taak is van de Israëlische regering de Palestijnen te beschermen tegen de kolonisten, nu de Palestijnse Autoriteit door de Israëlische acties ontmanteld is en niet in staat is haar burgers te beschermen?
6. Bent u bereid op korte termijn concrete initiatieven te presenteren die ertoe bijdragen dat zo spoedig mogelijk een internationale VN waarnemersmacht in de bezette gebieden ontplooid kan worden? Zo nee, waarom niet? Ziet u andere mogelijkheden om in internationaal verband (VN en EU) aan te dringen op internationale bemoeienis met de situatie?

(1) NRC Handelsblad 22 oktober '02 ■

steun e-mail?

beste vrienden,

zie hieronder: misschien willen jullie een steun e-mail sturen naar de ambassadeur ?

03/11 Belgische ambassadeur in Israël op het matje
De Belgische ambassadeur in Israël, Wilfried Geens, is zondag door de Israëlische minister van Buitenlandse Zaken op het matje geroepen over enkele uitspraken die hij onlangs deed. Die zouden beledigend zijn voor een Israëlisch minister, zo melden officiële bronnen.

"De Belgische ambassadeur is bij de minister geroepen voor zijn verklaringen die niet passen voor een ambassadeur", zegt een woordvoerder van het ministerie.

In een interview met de krant Kol el-Arab had de ambassadeur de minister van nationale infrastructuur Effie Eytam ervan beschuldigd "een fascist" te zijn. De diplomaat had ook gezegd dat "de Palestijnse gebieden het grootste interneringskamp ter wereld zijn".

<http://www.hbvl.be/nieuws/Binnenland/default.asp?art={3C77A914-B526-49D3-9307-CAB96B08AEFB}>

De volledige lijst kan je vinden op de webstek van onze vrienden van Buitenlandse Zaken:

<http://diplobel.fgov.be/Atlas/Atlas.asp?lng=EN>

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SILENT SIT-IN BLOCKING BULLDOZERS IN JAYYOUS

[Jayyous village, Qalqilia] Approximately 100 Palestinian farmers and 10 foreign nationals are holding a silent sit-in on farmland in Jayyous that was demolished yesterday.

After local Palestinians and international civilians managed to stop the destruction of Palestinian farmland in the village of Falami yesterday, Israeli authorities instructed contractors to move to Jayyous where destruction was wreaked upon land and trees not scheduled to be demolished for the "separation wall" that the Israeli government is building. The peaceful protesters are now sitting along the path that was cleared and are blocking further destruction by the bulldozers.

Over 35 international civilians, including the French Consul General, Regis Koetschet, and a delegation of Israeli civilians are now gathered in the village of Falami in protest of the destruction of this village's agricultural land. The Swedish Consul General, Mrs. Katarina Kipp, is also on her way. Local farmers and international civilians have been blocking bulldozer work here for the past couple of days, yesterday sustain-

ing injuries at the hands of the Israeli security forces while trying to save olive trees from being chain sawed and uprooted. The bulldozers have yet to arrive in Falami and villagers are out harvesting olives.

For more information:

In Jayyous

Dunya: 067-628-369

Susan: 055-271-631

In Falami:

Osama: 052-225-703

Heidi: 067-365-669

General information:

ISM office: 02-277-4602 or Huwaida at 067-473-308

Huwaida Arraf

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT

www.palsolidarity.org

"If the people lead, the leaders will follow" ■