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Nederlands
Palestina Komitee Persbericht
De dag nadat de EU-ministers van Buitenlandse
Zaken, bijeen in hun bijeenkomst van de General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussel op 12 december jl., besloten
het rapport terzijde te leggen – uit vrees voor verwijdering
tussen de EU en Israël hetgeen een negatief effect zou hebben
op de invloed van de EU – kondigde Israël, in strijd met
zijn verplichtingen onder de Routekaart en strijdig met de vierde
Geneefse Conventie [zie ook de VN-resolutie van 20 juli 2004 op basis
van het advies van het Internationaal Gerechtshof van 9 juli 2004!
], de bouw aan van 300 nieuwe woningen in de nederzetting van Ma’aleh
Adumim, de grootste nederzetting in de bezette Palestijnse gebieden.
Voorzitter NPK
Organisaties
die deelnemen aan deze aktie: European
Co-ordinating Committee of NGOs on the question of Palestine (ECCP),
Chairman
Pierre Galand,
+ 32
2 223 07 56
eccp@skynet.be European
Jews for a Just Peace
(EJJP), Secretary
Dan Judelson, + 44 (0) 779 339 2820
www.ejjp.org Plus: Alternative
Information Centre, Bethlehem & Jerusalem www.alternativenews.org
Arab
Center for Agricultural Development acad@palnet.com
Arab
Media Watch, UK www.arabmediawatch.blogspot.com
Association
Belgo-Palestinienne www.association-belgo-palestinienne
AIPPP Strasbourg
www.protection-palestine.org
BADIL
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem www.badil.org
Civimed
Initiatives, Strasbourg www.protection-palestine.org Collectif
judéo-arabe et citoyen pour la paix, Strasbourg
www.protection-palestine.org Committee
for a Just Peace in the Middle East, Luxembourg
www.cercle.lu Coordination
de l'Appel de Strasbourg
www.protection-palestine.org Council
for the Advancement of Arab British Understanding, UK
www.caabu.org Een
Ander Joods Geluid, Netherlands
www.eajg.nl
Farrah,
France www.protection-palestine.org Friends
of Sabeel-UK www.sabeel.org/old/friends.html
Foundation
TALLIQ, Netherlands
www.talliq.nl
Humanistic
Peace Council, Netherlands agpolak@freeler.nl
ISM
London
www.ism-london.org.uk
Israeli
Committee Against House Demolitions-UK www.icahduk.org
Jews
for Israeli Palestinian Peace, Sweden
www.jipf.nu Jews
for Justice for Palestinians, UK
www.jfjfp.org Joint
action for Israeli Palestinian Peace, UK
info@jaipp.org.uk
Judische
Stimme für gerechten Frieden in Nahost, Berlin
www.juedische-stimme.de
Just
Peace UK http://groups.yahoo.com/group/justpeaceuk
Netherlands
Palestine Committee www.xs4all.nl/~npk
Network
of Jews against theOccupation, Italy http://paceinmedioriente.iobloggo.com
NUS
Black Students’ Campaign, UK www.nusonline.co.uk/campaigns/blackstudentscampaign
Palestine
Forum in Britain www.pfb.org.uk
Palestine
Solidarity Campaign, UK www.palestinecampaign.org
Society
for Austrian Arab Relations, Austria
www.saar.at Stop the Occupation, Netherlands. www.stopdebezetting.nl Transnational
Institute, Netherlands www.tni.org Union
Juive Francaise pour la Paix www.ujfp.org
Union
des Progresssite Juifs de Belgiques
www.upjb.be War
on Want, UK www.waronwant.org
Women
in Black, The Netherlands www.vrouweninhetzwart.nl
JERUSALEM
AND RAMALLAH HEADS OF MISSION REPORT
ON EAST JERUSALEM SUMMARY 1.
East Jerusalem is of central importance to the Palestinians in
political, economic, social and religious terms.
Several inter-linked Israeli policies are reducing the
possibility of reaching a final status agreement on Jerusalem, and
demonstrate a clear Israeli intention to turn the annexation of East
Jerusalem into a concrete fact:
2.
The plan to expand the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim into the
so-called “E1” area, east of Jerusalem, threatens to complete the
encircling of the city by Jewish settlements, dividing the West Bank
into two separate geographical areas.
The proposed extension of the barrier from East Jerusalem to
form a bubble around the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim would have the
same effect. 2004 saw a
near tripling of the number of Palestinian buildings demolished in
East Jerusalem. We expect
a similar number of demolitions in 2005.
88 homes in the Silwan neighbourhood with demolition orders
outstanding against them attracted much attention in June. 3.
When the barrier has been completed, Israel will control
access to and from East Jerusalem, cutting off its Palestinian
satellite cities of Bethlehem and Ramallah, and the rest of the West
Bank beyond. This will have serious economic, social and humanitarian
consequences for the Palestinians.
By vigorously applying policies on residency and ID status,
Israel will be able finally to complete the isolation of East
Jerusalem – the political, social, commercial and infrastructural
centre of Palestinian life. 4.
Israel’s activities in Jerusalem are in violation of both its
Roadmap obligations and international law.
We and others in the international community have made our
concerns clear on numerous occasions, to varying effect. Palestinians
are, without exception, deeply alarmed about East Jerusalem.
They fear that Israel will “get away with it”, under the
cover of disengagement. Israeli
actions also risk radicalising the hitherto relatively quiescent
Palestinian population in East Jerusalem.
Clear statements by the European Union and the Quartet that
Jerusalem remains an issue for negotiation by the two sides, and that
Israel should desist from all measures designed to pre-empt such
negotiations, would be timely. We
should also support Palestinian cultural, political and economic
activities in East Jerusalem. JERUSALEM
AND RAMALLAH HEADS OF MISSION REPORT
ON EAST JERUSALEM SUMMARY 1.
East Jerusalem is of central importance to the Palestinians in
political, economic, social and religious terms.
Several inter-linked Israeli policies are reducing the
possibility of reaching a final status agreement on Jerusalem, and
demonstrate a clear Israeli intention to turn the annexation of East
Jerusalem into a concrete fact:
2.
The plan to expand the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim into the
so-called “E1” area, east of Jerusalem, threatens to complete the
encircling of the city by Jewish settlements, dividing the West Bank
into two separate geographical areas.
The proposed extension of the barrier from East Jerusalem to
form a bubble around the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim would have the
same effect. 2004 saw a
near tripling of the number of Palestinian buildings demolished in
East Jerusalem. We expect
a similar number of demolitions in 2005.
88 homes in the Silwan neighbourhood with demolition orders
outstanding against them attracted much attention in June. 3.
When the barrier has been completed, Israel will control
access to and from East Jerusalem, cutting off its Palestinian
satellite cities of Bethlehem and Ramallah, and the rest of the West
Bank beyond. This will have serious economic, social and humanitarian
consequences for the Palestinians.
By vigorously applying policies on residency and ID status,
Israel will be able finally to complete the isolation of East
Jerusalem – the political, social, commercial and infrastructural
centre of Palestinian life. 4.
Israel’s activities in Jerusalem are in violation of both its
Roadmap obligations and international law.
We and others in the international community have made our
concerns clear on numerous occasions, to varying effect. Palestinians
are, without exception, deeply alarmed about East Jerusalem.
They fear that Israel will “get away with it”, under the
cover of disengagement. Israeli
actions also risk radicalising the hitherto relatively quiescent
Palestinian population in East Jerusalem.
Clear statements by the European Union and the Quartet that
Jerusalem remains an issue for negotiation by the two sides, and that
Israel should desist from all measures designed to pre-empt such
negotiations, would be timely. We
should also support Palestinian cultural, political and economic
activities in East Jerusalem.
RECOMMENDATIONS On the political level
On an operational level
-
support legal projects designed to support Palestinians threatened by
house demolitions and those who have been victims thereof -
promote initiatives to legalise “illegal” houses (e.g. through
introducing retroactively alternative town planning schemes) -
facilitate a solution for obtaining building permits -
EU projects with a Palestinian NGO on legal counselling concerning
building permits and house demolitions -
EU project on the development of a master plan for urban planning and
legal housing for Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. §
Facilitate a solution of the access issue. This would comprise a range of political and operational
measures, both short and long term §
Support local and international organisations in their information
efforts on East Jerusalem. §
Enhance EU assistance to Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem,
including cultural activities and community empowerment. JERUSALEM
AND RAMALLAH HEADS OF MISSION REPORT
ON EAST JERUSALEM DETAIL 1.
Jerusalem is already one of the trickiest issues on the road to reaching
a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
But several inter-linked Israeli policies are reducing the
possibility of reaching a final status agreement on Jerusalem that any
Palestinian could accept. We
judge that this is a deliberate Israeli policy – the completion of
the annexation of East Jerusalem.
Israeli measures also risk radicalising the hitherto relatively
quiescent Palestinian population of East Jerusalem. EU POLICY ON EAST JERUSALEM 2.
The EU policy on Jerusalem is based on the principles set out in UN
Security Council Resolution 242, notably the impossibility of
acquisition of territory by force.
In consequence the EU has never recognised the annexation of
East Jerusalem under the Israeli 1980 Basic Law (Basic Law Jerusalem
Capital of Israel) which made Jerusalem the “complete and united”
capital of Israel. EU
Member States have therefore placed their accredited missions in Tel
Aviv. The EU opposes
measures that would prejudge the outcome of Permanent Status
Negotiations, consigned to the third phase of the Road Map, such as
actions aimed at changing the status of East Jerusalem. 3.
In conferences held in 1999 and 2001, the High Contracting Parties
reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
reiterated the need for full respect for the provisions of the said
Convention in that territory. 4.
In July 2004 the EU acknowledged the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the “legal consequences of the
construction of a Wall in the occupied Palestinian territories
including in and around East Jerusalem” and voted in favour of the
General Assembly Resolution that recognised it.
While the EU recognises Israel’s security concerns and its
right to act in self-defence, the EU position on the legality of the
separation barrier largely coincides with the ICJ Advisory Opinion. SETTLEMENTS 5.
Israel is increasing settlement activity in three east-facing
horseshoe shaped bands in and around East Jerusalem, linked by new
roads: §
first through new settlements in the old city itself and in the
Palestinian neighbourhoods immediately surrounding the old city (Silwan,
Ras al Amud, At Tur, Wadi al Joz, Sheikh Jarrah); §
then in the existing major East Jerusalem settlement blocs (running
clockwise from Ramot, Rekhes Shu’afat, French Hill, through the new
settlements in the first band, above, to East Talpiot, Har Homa and
Gilo); §
and finally in “Greater Jerusalem” – linking the city of Jerusalem
to the settlement blocs of Givat Ze’ev to the north, Ma’aleh
Adumim to the east (including the E1 area, see below), and the Etzion
bloc to the south. Settlement activity and construction is ongoing
in each of these three bands, contrary to Israel’s obligations under
international law and the Roadmap. “E1” and Ma’aleh Adumim 6.
E1 (derived from ‘East 1’) is the term applied by the Israeli
Ministry of Housing to a planned new neighbourhood within the
municipal borders of the large Israeli settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim
(30,000+ residents), linking it to the municipal boundary of Jerusalem
(a unilateral Israeli line well east of the Green Line).
E1, along with a maximalist barrier around Ma’ale Adumim,
would complete the encircling of East Jerusalem and cut the West Bank
into two parts, and further restrict access into and out of Jerusalem.
The economic prospects of the Wset Bank (where GDP is under
$1000 a year) are highly dependent on access to East Jerusalem (where
GDP is around $3500 a year). Estimates
of the contribution made by East Jerusalem to the Palestinian economy
as a whole vary between a quarter and a third.
From an economic perspective, the viability of a Palestinian
state depends to a great extent on the preservation of organic links
between East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. 7.
E1 is an old plan which was drawn up by Rabin’s government in 1994 but
never implemented. The
plan was revived by the housing Ministry in 2003, and preliminary
construction in the E1 area began in 2004.
Since his resignation from the Cabinet Netanyahu has tried to
make E1 a campaign issue. The
development plans for E1 include: §
the erection of at least 3,500 housing units (for approx. 15,000
residents); §
an economic development zone; §
construction of the police headquarters for the West Bank that shall be
relocated from Raz el-Amud; §
commercial areas, hotels and “special housing”, universities and
“special projects”, a cemetery and a waste disposal site. §
About 75% of the plan’s total area is earmarked for a park that will
surround all these components. §
So far only the plans for the economic development zone have received the
necessary authorisations for building to commence.
The plans related to residential areas and the building of the
Police Headquarters have been approved by the Ma’aleh Adumim
Municipality but not yet by the Civil Administration’s Planning
Council. 8.
The current built-up area of Ma’aleh Adumim covers only 15% of
the planned area. The
overall plan for Ma’aleh Adumim, including E1, covers an area of at
least 53 square kilometres (larger than Tel Aviv) stretching from
Jerusalem to Jericho (comment: Israel’s
defence of settlement expansion “within existing settlement
boundaries” therefore covers a potentially huge area).
In August 2005 Israel published land requisition orders for
construction of the barrier around the southern edge of the Adumim
bloc, following the route approved by the Israeli cabinet on 20
February 2005 (including most of the municipal area of Ma’aleh
Adumim). 9.
The E1 project would cut across the main central traffic route for
Palestinians travelling from Bethlehem to Ramallah. This route is actually an alternative to route 60, which
until 2001 was the main north-south highway connecting the major
Palestinian cities (Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and
Hebron) on the ridge of mountains in the West Bank.
And Palestinians currently have only restricted access to route
60 (either permits are required for certain segments or roads are
blocked), especially from/to the Jerusalem area. 10.
Since 2003, some preparatory work has taken place.
In the northern sector of E-1, where residential housing is
planned, the top of a hill has been levelled in order to allow
construction. In the
southern section, where a police station and hotels are planned, an
unpaved road has been constructed.
But no further work has been carried out for over a year.
On 25 August 2005 Israel announced plans to build the new
police headquarters for the West Bank in E1, transferring it from its
present location in East Jerusalem.
Many previous settlements have started with a police station,
and we are aware from Israeli NGOs that Israel has plans to convert
the existing West Bank police headquarters, in Ras Al-Amud, into
further settlement housing. Settlement
building inside East Jerusalem 11.
Settlement building inside East Jerusalem continues at a rapid pace.
There are currently around 190,000 Israeli settlers in East
Jerusalem, the majority in large settlement blocks such as Pisgat
Ze’ev. The mainstream
Israeli view is that the so-called Israeli “neighbourhoods” of
East Jerusalem are not settlements because they are within the borders
of the Jerusalem Municipality. The
EU, along with the most of the rest of the international community,
does not recognise Israel’s unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem
and regards the East Jerusalem “neighbourhoods” as illegal
settlements like any others – but this does not deter Israel from
expanding them. Some of
these settlements are now expanding beyond even the Israeli-defined
municipal boundary of Jerusalem, further into the West Bank.
The Jerusalem municipality has also been active around
Rachel’s Tomb, outside the municipal boundaries. 12.
Smaller in number but of equal concern are settlements being implanted in
the heart of existing Palestinian neighbourhoods, with covert and
overt government assistance. Extremist
Jewish settler groups, often with foreign funding, use a variety of
means to take over Palestinian properties and land.
They either prey on Palestinians suffering financial hardship
or simply occupy properties by force and rely on the occasional
tardiness and/or connivance of the Israeli courts.
Such groups have told us that they also press the Israeli
authorities to demolish Palestinian homes built without permits.
Israel has previously used the “Absentee Property Law”[1]
(generally applied only inside Green Line Israel) to seize property
and land. The Attorney
General declared that this was “legally indefensible” in the
Bethlehem area earlier this year and the practise has stopped, but the
law remains applicable to East Jerusalem and can be resurrected any
time the Israeli Government sees fit. 13.
Some of the Jewish settlements lack building permits, but not one has
been demolished – in marked contrast to the situation for
Palestinians. There are
also plans to build a large new Jewish settlement within the Muslim
Quarter of the Old City, a step that would be particularly
inflammatory and could lead to the further “Hebronisation” of
Jerusalem. The aim of
these settlers, and settlements, is to extent the Jewish Israeli
presence into new areas. As
a result, President Clinton’s formula for Jerusalem (“what’s
Jewish becomes Israel and what’s Palestinian becomes Palestine”)
either cannot be applied – or Israel gets more. SEPARATION
BARRIER/WALL 14.
Israel has largely ignored the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 of the
International Court of Justice regarding the barrier. On 20 February 2005, the Israeli Government approved the
revised route of the separation barrier[2].
This route seals off most of East Jerusalem, with its 230,000
Palestinian residents, from the West Bank (i.e. it divides
Palestinians from Palestinians, rather than Palestinians from
Israelis). The Barrier is
not only motivated by security considerations.
On 21 June 2005, the Israeli High Court ruled that it was legal
to take into account political considerations, in addition to security
considerations, for the routing of the barrier in East Jerusalem
because East Jerusalem had been Israeli territory since its annexation
in 1967 (i.e. political considerations are not legal in the West Bank,
which has not been annexed to Israel).
On 10 July the Israeli Cabinet decided to route the Jerusalem
barrier so as to keep around 55,000 East Jerusalemite Palestinians,
mainly in the Shu’afat refugee camp, outside the barrier.
The fact that the Cabinet decision not only included short-term
but also long-term measures designed to accommodate the new situation
created by the Barrier – e.g. constructing new educational
institutions and encouraging hospitals to open branches “beyond the
fence” – appears to contradict the notion of the Barrier being a
temporary rather than a permanent structure.
And if Israel were to provide adequate municipal services to
the areas excluded (as it is promising to do) this would be in
contrast to hitherto poor service provision in the rest of East
Jerusalem. Israeli NGOs
working on the Jerusalem issue have looked at Israeli proposals to
ensure that the people affected are not “cut off” from the city,
and judged them deficient. 15.
The barrier extends like a cloverleaf to the northwest, southwest and
east, beyond even the (Israeli defined) municipal boundary of
Jerusalem, leaving 164 square kilometres of West Bank land on the
“Israeli” (western) side. Combined
with settlement activity in these areas this de-facto annexation of
Palestinian land will be irreversible without very large scale forced
evacuations of settlers and the re-routing of the barrier – which
reportedly cost 800,000 euros per kilometre.
It will also block the alternative Bethlehem-Ramallah route for
Palestinians, forcing them to travel via tunnels or Jericho. 16.
We should ensure that any support we provide to East Jerusalem is not
simply an attempt to reduce the negative consequences of the
construction of the separation barrier.
The ICJ ruling on the barrier, accepted by the EU with limited
reservations, states: “all
States are under an obligation not to recognise the illegal situation
resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem.
They are also under an obligation not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such
construction”. RESTRICTIONS ON/DEMOLITIONS OF PALESTINIAN HOUSING 17.
The Israeli authorities place severe restrictions on the building of
Palestinian housing in East Jerusalem.
The Israeli authorities will only issue building permits for
areas that have zoned “master plans”.
The municipality produces such plans for areas marked for
settlement development, but not for Palestinian areas – only
Palsetinians are expected to draw up their own plans, at great
(generally unaffordable) expense. So each year Palestinians receive less than 100 building
permits, and even these require a wait of several years. At the same time, rules requiring Palestinians with Jerusalem
residency status either to reside in the city or risk forfeiting that
status have forced thousands of Palestinians in this situation to move
from other areas of the West Bank back to Jerusalem, adding to the
severe pressure on housing. As
a result, most new Palestinian housing is built without permits and is
therefore considered “illegal” by the Israeli authorities
(although under the 4th Geneva Convention occupying powers
may not extend their jurisdiction to occupied territory).
The restrictions and demolitions also leave undeveloped (but
Palestinian-owned) land available for new settlements or the expansion
of existing settlements. 18.
In 2004, at least 152 buildings (most of them residential) were
demolished in East Jerusalem, a sharp increase over previous years (66
in 2003, 36 in 2002, 32 in 2001 and 9 in 2000).
In May 2005 the Jerusalem municipality’s intention to destroy
88 houses in the Silwan neighbourhood became public.
Following media scrutiny and international pressure, they have
put these demolitions on hold, but the future of Silwan remains
uncertain, with demolition orders remaining in place.
In the meantime, elsewhere in Palestinian neighbourhoods, homes
continue to be demolished on a regular basis.
According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions 52
buildings (including a seven-storey building and eight petrol
stations) have been demolished in East Jerusalem so far this year. The municipality’s budget for house demolitions (approved
late, in March) stands at NIS 4m (approximately 800k euros), a figure
slightly higher than last year. Our
contacts estimate that this will allow the municipality to demolish
150-170 buildings. In
cases where the municipality is deemed not to be carrying out its duty
to demolish illegal buildings (whether through lack of will or budget
constraints), the Ministry of Interior can and does demolish buildings
(fourteen in 2004, six so far in 2005).
House demolitions are illegal under international law (see
above), serve no obvious security purpose (but rather relate to
settlement expansion), have a catastrophic humanitarian effect, and
fuel bitterness and extremism. Palestinians
continue to build illegally because they have no alternative, and
because the municipality and Interior Ministry together can only
demolish a fraction of the approximately 12,000 “illegal” homes in
existence. Palestinians
describe it to us as “a lottery”. ID
CARDS AND RESIDENCY STATUS 19.
Some Palestinians have blue Israeli ID cards, that give them the
“right” to live in Israel (in practice, in East Jerusalem), but
not to vote in Israeli national elections or take an Israeli passport. The renewal of these Blue ID cards is a lengthy, cumbersome
and at times humiliating process to be carried out every year at the
East Jerusalem office of the Israeli Ministry of Interior.
The remainder have green West Bank ID cards or orange Gaza ID
cards, and must apply for a permit to enter East Jerusalem. Eevn for those West Bankers and Gazans regularly employed in
East Jerusalem, these entry permits have to be renewed every three
months. Between 1996-1999
Israel implemented a “centre of life” policy meaning that those
with blue ID found living or working outside East Jerusalem, for
example in Ramallah, would lose their ID.
A wave of blue ID cardholders therefore quickly moved back to
East Jerusalem. The
residency of hundreds of Palestinians that lived for a prolonged
period outside of Israel and the OTs was revoked, a policy that
continues. Renewed
application of this rule and the construction of the barrier around
Jerusalem has led to a second wave of “immigration” of blue ID
card-holders to the city. Israel has also announced that it plans to introduce
biometric, machine-readable ID cards.
This is of great concern to Palestinians because it would
enable Israel to check if blue ID cardholders really do live and work
in the city, and if not, to expel more of them. 20.
Israel’s main motivation is almost certainly demographic – to reduce
the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, while exerting efforts to
boost the number of Jewish Israelis living in the city – East and
West. The Jerusalem
master plan has an explicit goal to keep the proportion of Palestinian
Jerusalemites at no more than 30% of the total.
But the policy has severe humanitarian consequences – couples
in which one spouse has a Blue ID and the other a Green ID will be
forced to leave Jerusalem (Israel permits the transfer of blue ID
status to spouses and children in theory but very rarely in practice).
Palestinians with Israeli IDs already live in something of an
identity limbo – neither Israeli Arabs, nor linked to the
Palestinian Authority – and these measures can only worsen their
situation. The separation
of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank is crippling both
areas economically, and the influx of returning blue ID card-holders
is exacerbating the housing crisis – property prices and rents are
soaring. MUNICIPALITY
POLICIES 21.
The Jerusalem municipality is responsible for the majority of the house
demolitions carried out in East Jerusalem (see above).
It also contributes to the economic and social stagnation of
East Jerusalem through other policies.
The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions claims that
while Palestinians contribute 33% of the municipality’s taxes, in
return it spends only 8% of its budget in Palestinian areas.
The exact figures are hard to assess, but discrimination in
expenditure is obvious. Palestinian
areas of the city are characterised by poor roads, little or no street
cleaning, and an absence of well-maintained public spaces, in sharp
contrast to areas where Israelis live (in both West Jerusalem and East
Jerusalem settlements). Even
Jewish ultra-orthodox neighbourhoods (which contribute very little in
taxes, for various reasons) are far better provided for by the
municipality. The
provision of services in what is, according to Israeli definitions, a
single municipality, is therefore subject to discriminatory practices.
Palestinians regard municipal taxes as a tax on their residency
rights, rather than a quid pro quo for municipal services. The high level of taxation (given that Palestinian incomes are
typically much lower) and discriminatory law enforcement that appears
to target Palestinians for fines for a variety of offences (traffic
violations, parking offences, no TV licence etc) further worsen the
economic situation of Palestinians.
This makes it harder for them to maintain their residency in
the city, and more vulnerable to settler groups or Palestinian
collaborators offering them good money for their property or land. HUMANITARIAN
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 22.
Cutting the link between East Jerusalem and the West Bank: Palestinian
East Jerusalem has traditionally been the centre of political,
commercial, religious and cultural activities for the West Bank, with
Palestinians operating as one cohesive social and economic unit. Separation from the rest of the West Bank is affecting the
economy and weakening the social fabric.
Since Israel’s occupation of the eastern part of Jerusalem in
1967, Palestinian access to Jerusalem from the West Bank has been
increasingly restricted. During
the Oslo Process, in 1993, the Israeli government banned entry for all
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza without a permit.
Settlements together with by-pass roads have further restricted
access in Jerusalem. And
the Barrier has further aggravated the situation. 23.
Threats to Residency Status: Palestinian Blue ID holders outside the
barrier are increasingly unable to access East Jerusalem, forcing them
to access educational, medical and religious services in the rest of
the West Bank. This
jeopardises their Jerusalem residency rights, according to the Israeli
“centre of life” policy. 24.
Impact on the Education and Health Care Sector:
West Bankers also face increasing difficulties in accessing the
major Palestinian centres of health care and education in East
Jerusalem. Schools in
East Jerusalem that depend on West Bank staff are at urgent risk of
closure. The same applies
to hospitals: in addition
to the dwindling numbers of patients from the West Bank due to access
problems, some Israeli insurance companies are demanding that staff
must have Israeli professional qualifications and registration.
According to the PA Ministry for Jerusalem Affairs,
approximately 68% of medical staff working at hospitals in East
Jerusalem reside outside its municipal boundaries.
The lack of patients and staff will cause a decline of the
number and range of services, which often are not available in the
West Bank. 25.
Restriction of religious freedom: Christians
and Muslims living east of the Barrier already have restricted access
to their holy sites. West
Bankers are finding it increasingly difficult to get to the Haram al
Sharif/Temple Mount compound – because of the wider system of
permits to enter Jerusalem, and the barrier.
No males under 45 are allowed onto the compound.
The Director of the Awqaf, which controls the mosques, has
complained particularly about increasing Israeli measures to dominate
and control the compound. Police
have been regularly patrolling the compound for a year.
The Israelis say this is to ensure good settler behaviour, but
the effect is that it intimidates worshippers.
The Israelis have also introduced new measures over the past
few weeks – cameras have been placed at every gate, outside the
Haram but pointing in. Thus
every entrance is tightly controlled.
The Israelis have also begun erecting fences on the buildings
surrounding the Haram. Muslim
concerns regarding access to (and threats to) the Haram al-Sharif
mosques have both security and political implications.
Perceived “threats” to the mosques by Jewish groups and the
denial of access to Muslims regularly spark confrontations, and
motivate Palestinian extremists. 26.
The wider political consequences of the above measures are of even
greater concern. As
outlined above, prospects for a two-state solution with east Jerusalem
as the capital of Palestine are receding.
The greater the level of settlement activity in and around East
Jerusalem the harder it will be to say what is Palestinian, and to
link this up with the rest of the West Bank.
Israeli activity in E1 and the fencing off of a broad area
around Ma’ale Adumim are of particular concern in this regard.
Israeli policies in East Jerusalem are making proposals for a
resolution of the conflict along the one developed by the Geneva
Initiative in 2003, a civil society initiative which was welcomed by
the EU, harder to achieve. 27.
Arrangements to facilitate the PA Presidential Election in East Jerusalem
in January 2005 were unsatisfactory – Israel closed down voter
registration centres, candidates could not campaign freely in the
city, and restrictions on the number of polling stations led to chaos
on election day. The
report of former Prime Minister Rocard’s Elections Observation
Mission sets out the problems clearly, along with recommendations for
improvements ahead of the PLC elections, scheduled for 25 January
2006. [1] Israel passed the Absentee Property Law in 1950. It states that any landowner who left her/his permanent residence at any time following November 29, 1947 to any Arab State, or to any area of the Land of Israel, which is not part of the State of Israel (i.e. West Bank and Gaza) automatically forfeited any property within the State of Israel to the Absenteed Property Custodian – a public body, which subsequently transferred title to these properties to the State. Most of these lands – primarily in the Negev and the Galilee – were used to build kibbutzim, moshavim and development towns for the Jewish population. [2] Map available at: http://www.btselem.org/Downloads/Jerusalem_Separation_Barrier_Eng.PDF
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